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Three variations of experience identified in the educational literature entail different ways of thinking 
about and developing learners’ imaginations. The relationship between these different imaginative 
modes resembles shifts between different kinds of understanding in Kieran Egan’s theory of imagina-
tive development. From this theoretical collision, a new framework emerges that gives greater weight 
to the connections between experience and imagination, and that may help to guide new forms of 
democratic educational practice.
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We live in an age and in a culture when young people may spend more time interact-ing with electronic devices than with one 
another, let alone with the more- than- human world. Primary or 
firsthand experience risks becoming a dwindling resource in the 
face of the great flood of secondhand information that flows daily 
through the modern media. Learning to deal critically and 
intelligently with the latter is self- evidently an important facet of 
democratic education. But what of the former? What, exactly, is the 
educational value of experience? And are particular varieties of 
experience more essential than others for the building of a living 
democracy? How might we think strategically and creatively about 
the embedding of experience in the process of schooling? These are 
the kinds of questions I hope to shed light on in this essay.
My initial engagement with these issues arose from my work 
with Canadian indigenous organizations on the problem of 
language maintenance and revitalization (e.g., Fettes, 1992; Fettes & 
Norton, 2000). Around the world, local languages are being lost at 
an ever- increasing rate, with far- reaching consequences for human 
cultural diversity and development (Nettle & Romaine, 2000) and, 
more broadly, for ecocultural health (Rapport & Maffi, 2011). At the 
heart of what is being lost are locally sensitive ways of understand-
ing human embeddedness in the more- than- human world (Abram, 
1997). Responses to language loss that focus on language alone miss 
this key point: Indigenous languages derive much of their meaning 
from their responsiveness to ecologically and historically particular 
shared experiences of place and being. The relationship between 
experience and language thus becomes an extremely important 
question for educators who see cultural diversity as a value and a 
resource, whether on grounds of equity, inclusion, critique, or 
sustainability.
Yet teasing out that relationship is a complex task. Language is 
a problematic enough term in and of itself (Fettes, 1997, 2003); 
experience is at least equally fraught with ambiguity, as experiential 
educator Fox (2008) observed in a thoughtful meditation:
What exactly is experience? Whose experience is heard? . . . Think for 
a moment: When does an experience begin— at the start of an 
activity? Does it include the planning and framing by leaders? What 
about the histories and political realities of the participants? What 
historical period will we choose? Once the “experience” begins, how 
does an individual, observer, researcher, participant, or leader identify 
“the” experience? How is an experience demarcated from the flow of 
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life? How is any experience framed by the participant, leader, society, 
culture, or educational program? Who gets to say what is important 
about an experience? What if the leader and participant frame it 
differently? (p. 39)
The American pragmatists James and Dewey took experience 
to constitute the basic reality of human existence, more or less 
synonymous with being. But they fully acknowledged its complex-
ity, James (1904) referring to “a quasi- chaos” (“Substitution,” para. 2) 
and Dewey (1916/2008) to “a single continuous interaction of a great 
diversity (literally countless in number) of energies” (p. 174). Such 
complexity emerges not only from the many different kinds of 
experience open to human beings but also to the countless ways 
such experiences can be understood, through what James (1904) 
called “substitutional experience” but we more routinely refer to as 
acts of interpretation. The meaning of experience is not simply 
given once and for all in the experience itself. Rather, experience 
feeds what Polanyi (1974) called “personal knowledge” (direct, tacit, 
embodied knowledge that develops through dwelling in the world) 
and “reflective knowledge” (explicit, linguified knowledge that 
draws on cultural/cognitive tools shared through our social 
discourse networks). There is, as philosopher Zwicky observed (as 
cited in Dickinson & Goulet, 2010), an “extraordinary tension” (p. 
143) between these kinds of knowing— one that runs through all of 
the questions posed by Fox, above. The meaning of experience is 
never just individual and idiosyncratic but also profoundly 
collective and cultural. Because of this, it is always open to elabora-
tion and contestation; and this process, as Dewey saw, lies at the 
heart of education in a democratic society.
From my initial interest in linguistic and cultural diversity, 
then, my inquiry has broadened to include more general questions. 
How do learners make sense of experience? How can they come, 
over time, to do so more richly, more insightfully, more produc-
tively? And how can educators guide such learning as effectively 
and inclusively as possible? In agreement with Fox, I see both 
theoretical and heuristic value in addressing these questions 
through “alternative taxonomic strategies” (Fox, 2008, p. 49)— 
ways of conceptualizing distinctive kinds of educational meaning 
offered by experience. Such strategies should point to different 
ways of structuring and mediating experience— that is, they should 
encourage new forms of educational practice— and they should 
also suggest new questions to ask about the educational process.
My approach is a somewhat circuitous one. I begin by 
introducing philosophical work on the role of imagination in 
education (Egan, 1997), which provides interesting insights into 
the reflective (making- sense- through- language) kinds of under-
standing we are concerned with. I then orchestrate a collision 
between this framework and Roberts’s (2008) notion of “variations 
of experience,” which speaks more directly to our tacit (dwelling- 
in- the- world) kinds of understanding. While this theoretical 
reconstruction occupies most of the available space, whenever 
possible I suggest how such a framework may serve to “enrich 
research and nourish practice” (Fox, 2008, p. 52), both inside and 
outside of schools.
Imagination and Understanding
Educators interested in experience have rarely shown much 
interest in the imagination, and vice versa. This is somewhat 
curious, since the imagination has long been regarded in Western 
philosophy as a kind of intermediary between the world of the 
senses and the world of thought (Brann, 1993; Jay, 2004). The 
transformation of experience into meaning represents a kind of 
alchemy that imagination should, somehow, be involved in. Yet the 
imagination has not been a welcome guest in the institutions of 
classical or “solid” modernity. If one thinks of education in terms of 
desired and reliable outcomes, as our industrial civilization tends 
to do, one is likely to gravitate toward pedagogies that avoid 
surprises. So it is that imagination has rarely made an appearance 
in writing on formal schooling outside the domain of the arts (e.g., 
Greene, 1995).
In the last few years, however, imagination has emerged as an 
educational concern for scholars grounded in mythopoetics 
(Leonard & Willis, 2008), Jungian psychology (Jones, Clarkson, 
Congram, & Stratton, 2008), Steiner schooling (Nielsen, 2004), 
and creative approaches to mainstream classroom teaching 
(Blenkinsop, 2009; Egan, 2005; Egan & Madej, 2010; Egan, Stout, & 
Takaya, 2007; Judson, 2008; Nielsen, Fitzgerald, & Fettes, 2010), 
among others. These various approaches are only loosely con-
nected with one another, but share
a view of thought and understanding as necessarily embodied, 
emotional and contextual as well as linguistic, logical and abstract; a 
view of education as necessarily encompassing spirit and mystery as 
well as reason, collective consciousness and culture as well as 
individual nature; and a view of teaching as a kind of art, to be 
cultivated in much the same way as the other arts, involving both the 
mastery of medium and technique and the ineffable workings of 
intuition, serendipity, and talent. (Fettes, Nielsen, Haralambous, & 
Fitzgerald, 2010)
Unique among these diverse approaches is Egan’s cultural- 
historical theory of imaginative development. In a number of 
works, stretching from Educational Development (1979) to The 
Educated Mind (1997), Egan has suggested that we view human 
history as a process of coming to terms with the imaginative 
possibilities of language. He picks out, in particular, four dramatic 
cultural transformations: the development of oral language, the 
rise of literate societies, the establishment of communities of 
theoretic discourse and, most recently, the emergence of deep 
epistemic doubt. Each of these cultural discoveries, he argues, 
provided a new set of tools for engaging the imagination in making 
sense of the world; from the use of those tools, four distinctively 
languaged kinds of understanding emerged (in order: Mythic, 
Romantic, Philosophic, and Ironic) that continue to shape our 
cultures and our minds today. Child development recapitulates this 
process through the gradual, sequential appropriation of these 
different sets of cognitive tools. This is, however, far from an 
automatic or unproblematic process, and schools in their present 
form tend to be more of a hindrance than a help. As a remedy, Egan 
has offered a number of principles, frameworks, and examples, 
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most recently under the label of “imaginative education” (e.g. Egan, 
2005), intended to help teachers foster the development of Mythic, 
Romantic, or Philosophic understanding— the kinds of greatest 
relevance for the years of schooling (Egan, 1986, 1990, 1992, 1997, 
2005, 2006).
I turn in a moment to the role of embodiment and experience 
in Egan’s theory, but it may be helpful first to summarize these 
practical aspects of his approach. My take on it is based not only on 
Egan’s own published work but on a decade of working with 
teachers in workshops, courses, and research projects to put his 
ideas into practice. Here are what I see as the most distinctive 
features of imaginative education, Egan- style:
• Conceptualize the learning experience as a narrative co- created 
by the learners (Egan, 1988, Spring). Typically this involves a 
journey from an initial source of wonder about or mystery in a 
topic toward some kind of resolution that the learners themselves 
discover or create. Elsewhere I have described one particular 
narrative model that I have found useful in helping teachers plan 
this process (Fettes, 2011).
• Build each curricular narrative less on a logical sequence of ideas 
than on a central emotional tension (or imaginative theme) that 
helps dramatize the topic. Egan typically describes this in terms of 
“binary opposites” (if the object is to develop Mythic understand-
ing) or “heroic qualities” (Romantic)— for instance, basing a unit 
on properties of the air on the binary empty/full (Egan, 1997, pp. 
244−251) or a unit on the life cycle of eels on the heroic quality of 
persistence (Egan, 1992 pp. 93−102).
• Look for vivid, dramatic images, metaphors, and stories that 
connect with the central imaginative theme. Plan a variety of ways 
in which students can engage with these throughout the unit, 
actively as well as passively.
• Look for ways to incorporate cognitive tools that are likely to 
engage the imaginations of your particular students when you’re 
planning learning activities. Egan lists numerous examples of 
such tools in the context of the different kinds of understanding; 
for instance, the playful use of rhyme and rhythm can be useful in 
developing Mythic understanding, while the urge to collect and 
organize sets of things is equally characteristic of Romantic 
understanding (Egan, 1986, 1992, 1997, 2005; Fettes, 2010).
• Work to keep each kind of understanding active. Mythic under-
standing tends to dominate up to about age seven, Romantic from 
eight to fourteen, but the point is neither to remain content with 
these nor to leave them behind; rather, they should be seen as 
essential underpinnings to the development of Philosophic 
understanding through the teenage years and Ironic understand-
ing through adulthood.
Egan’s emphasis on planning frameworks can give the 
misleading impression that they alone lead to imaginative teaching 
and learning. A better way of putting it is that they can help 
teachers see new imaginative possibilities in what they do, that we 
can make imaginative engagement a central aim of classroom 
teaching, allowing teachers and students alike to tap into the 
emotional and intellectual energy it provides. The actual work of 
teaching remains a difficult, multifaceted challenge, but it becomes 
more exciting, successful, and rewarding when it works with the 
imagination rather than ignoring it or, worse, treating it as a 
problem.
Egan’s work encourages thoughtfulness and innovation in 
dealing with the content of the curriculum, but he has relatively 
little to say about how to work in the world of movement and 
sensation and social interaction. His principal interest is in the way 
that modes of language use influence our general imaginative take 
on the world. This linguistic bias is apparent in his developmental 
scheme, where Somatic understanding— the kind of understanding 
I referred to earlier as tacit, embodied knowledge— is relegated to 
the earliest years, before oral language takes over our processes of 
meaning- making. Of course, Egan is aware that this mode of 
understanding doesn’t disappear, and in The Educated Mind (1997) 
he highlighted its importance for the flexible, reflexive understand-
ing he called Ironic: the acme of his educational theory. Yet its role 
in the crucial years of schooling has been largely ignored.
Nonetheless, if we are looking for a theory of educational 
experience, there are some promising features of Egan’s account. 
By situating educational development within culture and history, 
it helps us avoid the trap Fox pointed to, of treating experience as 
if it were somehow sealed off from all our inherited baggage of 
meaning- making. More specifically, Egan’s framework sug-
gests— in agreement with Vygotskian psychology (Kozulin, 1998; 
Vygotsky, 1986, 1987)— that our ways of thinking about the world 
undergo significant transformation as learners pick up, use, and 
internalize the cognitive tools of our culture. If Egan’s kinds of 
understanding represent different stages or aspects of this 
restructuring, perhaps our ways of making sense of experience 
undergo similar shifts. This holds out the appealing prospect of a 
developmental theory that doesn’t keep language at arm’s length 
from our physical and ecological embeddedness in the world, but 
embraces both as essential, interlinked aspects of the unfolding of 
our human selves.
Pursuing this idea, I was struck by echoes of Egan’s kinds of 
understanding in the three educational variations of experience 
identified by Roberts (2008), following up on insights in Jay’s 
pioneering cultural study Songs of Experience (2004). According to 
Roberts, there are three distinctive conceptions of experience that 
have been influential in the development of Western educational 
traditions: “interactive experience, drawn from pragmatist philoso-
phy; embodied experience, drawn from Romanticism and phe-
nomenology; and experience as praxis, drawn from critical theory” 
(p. 21). As I dug deeper into the educational thinking underlying 
each of these variations, I came to see them as representing 
somewhat distinct imaginative modes of meaning- making, related 
to each other in the same fashion as Egan’s Mythic, Romantic, and 
Philosophic kinds of understanding relate to one another. Table 1 
depicts the general set of relationships involved.
In the following sections, I work upwards through the table, 
locating each mode of engagement and kind of understanding in 
the educational literature, explaining its relationship to Egan’s 
development theory, and tracing some practical implications of the 
framework.
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Imagination and Embodied Experience
Of Roberts’s three variations of experience, the first one I tackle is 
exemplified by certain kinds of wilderness education, notably 
solos, vision quests, and other highly individualized and transcen-
dent encounters with the more- than- human. We see its imagina-
tive dimension eloquently expounded by Emerson (1906a, b), 
perhaps the most influential North American proponent of this 
way of encountering the world. Here is how he put it in his widely 
read essay “Nature” (1906b):
To speak truly, few adult persons can see nature. Most persons do not 
see the sun. At least they have a very superficial seeing. The sun 
illuminates only the eye of the man, but shines into the eye and the 
heart of the child. The lover of nature is he whose inward and outward 
senses are still truly adjusted to each other; who has retained the spirit 
of infancy even into the era of manhood. His intercourse with heaven 
and earth, becomes part of his daily food. In the presence of nature, a 
wild delight runs through the man, in spite of real sorrows. . . . 
Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a 
clouded sky, without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special 
good fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the 
brink of fear. (pp. 6−7)
For Emerson (1836b), however, such direct and intense 
experience of nature was good not only for its own sake; it was also 
a source of intellectual depth. “We know more from nature than we 
can at will communicate. Its light flows into the mind evermore, 
and we forget its presence. . . . Every object, rightly seen, unlocks a 
new faculty of the soul” (pp. 29, 33). In short, he concluded, “The 
Imagination may be defined to be, the use which the Reason makes 
of the material world” (p. 50).
This conception, and the language in which it is expressed, 
bear clear affinities with the thinking of English Romantics such as 
Wordsworth and Coleridge. All of them saw education as leading, 
in general, to a shuttering of sensibility, a closing of the doors of 
perception, which could best be combated by imaginative encoun-
ters with living nature: “To me the meanest flower that blows can 
give/Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears” (Wordsworth, 
1919, lines 207– 208). To this school of thought, imagination is 
necessary for depth perception; it provides a bridge between the 
“inward and outward senses” (Emerson, 1836b, p. 7) that yields not 
only delight but understanding. And this depth is to be found 
primarily in the world of direct experience, toward which poetry 
and other forms of language merely gesture.
As Roberts (2008) noted, a contemporary (and philosophi-
cally sophisticated) version of these ideas can be found in Abram’s 
The Spell of the Sensuous (1997). Abram referred to the imagination 
only briefly in this book, but it is enough to confirm the affinity 
between his thinking and Emerson’s:
The perceiving body . . . gregariously participates in the activity of the 
world, lending its imagination to things in order to see them more 
fully. . . . Imagination is not a separate mental faculty (as we so often 
assume) but is rather the way the senses themselves have of throwing 
themselves beyond what is immediately given, in order to make 
tentative contact with the other sides of things that we do not sense 
directly, with the hidden or invisible aspects of the sensible. And yet 
such sensory anticipations and projections are not arbitrary; they 
regularly respond to suggestions offered by the sensible itself. (p. 58)
For Abram, citing the phenomenological philosopher 
Merleau- Ponty, “all of the creativity and free- ranging mobility 
that we have come to associate with the human intellect is, in 
truth, an elaboration, or recapitulation, of a profound creativity 
already underway at the most immediate level of sensory 
perception” (Abram, 1997, p. 49). It follows, of course, that when 
we cut ourselves off from direct immersion in the natural world, 
in rich sensory experience, we cripple our ability to think 
creatively and well.
In this light, language does not appear simply as a modest 
handmaiden to such “profound creativity” (Abram, 1997, p. 49) but 
as its potential enemy. “The map is not the territory,” as Korzybski 
(1958, p. 750) famously observed; if we come to base our under-
standing of the world on how we talk about it, we may well lose 
touch with what that world really feels (and smells and tastes and 
sounds and looks) like. Egan (1997) is alert to this tension, which he 
has discussed in terms of the gap between Somatic and all subse-
quent forms of “languaged understanding” (p. 170). Yet his 
proposed resolution— an eventual return to the Somatic in the 
context of Ironic understanding— does not go far enough for 
educators such as Emerson and Abram, who are at pains to stress 
that language can and should be kept in responsive contact with 
the world of experience, all the way through the process of 
language development and intellectual growth. Emerson (1836b) 
referred approvingly (if somewhat quaintly, to modern ears) to 
“the conversation of a strong- natured farmer or back- woodsman, 
which all men relish” (p. 27) and to the eloquence of “the poet, the 
orator, bred in the woods, whose senses have been nourished by 
Table 1. Modes and pathways of imaginative development
Mode of Engagement Encounter-Driven Language-Driven
IMPLICATION Endemic: Imaginative understanding 
through situated engagement
Philosophic: Imaginative understanding through disci-
plined inquiry
REALIZATION Harmonic: Imaginative understand-
ing through purposeful engagement
Romantic: Imaginative understanding through popular 
literacy
PARTICIPATION Somatic: Imaginative understanding 
through bodily engagement
Mythic: Imaginative understanding through oral storying
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their fair and appeasing changes, year after year, without design and 
without heed” (p. 29). Abram (1997), writing a century and a half 
later, placed greater emphasis on the oral cultures of indigenous 
peoples, in which “the solidarity between language and the animate 
landscape is palpable and evident” (p. 87). The educational ideal, in 
each case, is the same: If life is lived in close connection with the 
natural world, the living language will reflect that, to its speakers’ 
lasting benefit.
What characterizes this experience- proximal language? Rich 
and precise imagery, according to Emerson; stories and songs “that 
have the rhythm and lilt of the local soundscape,” according to 
Abram (1997, p. 273)— that is, language that works with the body’s 
recollection of sensory encounters with the world. In many 
respects, this is the language Egan (1997) viewed as central to the 
development of Mythic understanding, a language of embodied 
kinship, of embeddedness in the rhythms and contrasts of daily life:
When teaching about the earthworm, for example . . . it is not so much 
a matter of seeing the earthworm in terms of our senses as performing 
the imaginative act of recognizing earthwormness in ourselves. The 
task is imaginatively to incorporate the world rather than simply learn 
facts about something “out there.” Similarly, when teaching about 
flowers, one could imagine emerging from the cold ground, pushing 
towards the light, bursting with a kind of ecstasy in the warmer air, 
turning with passion towards the sun, feeling the rush of sap, then 
experiencing the horror of the returning cold, and shriveling back 
underground. (pp. 61−62)
For Egan, as for Emerson, this kind of vivid use of language 
underlies our ability to think powerfully and clearly about abstract 
topics, an ability that will later be greatly extended through the 
tools of literacy and theoretic reasoning.
If, then, we drop Egan’s insistence on placing Somatic and 
Mythic understanding in a developmental sequence and regard 
them instead as two aspects of a particular imaginative relationship 
with the world, we arrive at an educational ideal much closer to 
Emerson’s and Abram’s. In this case one might see all three theorists 
as contributing to a theory of imaginative participation, in which 
language and experience (or reflective and tacit knowledge) play 
contrasting but not incompatible roles. Mythic understanding, in 
this alternative interpretation, emerges in response to our desire to 
participate fully in our cultural milieu, just as Somatic understand-
ing arises through our wholehearted participation in embodied 
experience. In these imaginative modes, our sense of self readily 
extends into the world around us: We are, momentarily, the wild 
flower nodding by the path, or Little Red Riding Hood venturing 
off into the forest; we feel in ourselves the beauty and fragility of the 
one, the innocence and courage of the other. The kind of delight felt 
in each case, and the intellectual enrichment associated with it, is 
much the same.
In a recent paper (Fettes, 2011), I spelled out some of the 
educational implications of this idea. One, obviously, is that 
Egan’s recommendations for the development of Mythic under-
standing (e.g., Egan, 1986, 1988, 1997, 2005) need to be comple-
mented by a deliberate cultivation of vivid sensory experience, 
whether the learners are young children (as Egan envisioned) or 
older students (including, crucially, preservice teachers: 
Chodakowski, 2009; Chodakowski, Egan, Judson, & Stewart, 
2011; Fettes, 2005). Perhaps less obviously, the framework also 
implies that experiential educators can greatly enhance the 
meaningfulness of such firsthand experience by deliberately 
enriching and developing the oral language used to describe it, 
using Egan’s tools of Mythic understanding. The possibility that 
the narrative structuring of educational experience advocated by 
Egan can be fruitfully applied in experiential education settings is 
also worth exploring (Fettes, 2011).
Imagination and Interactive Experience
The second of Roberts’s variations of experience is found at the 
heart of Dewey’s educational (and ethical) theory (Pappas, 2008) 
and most concisely articulated in Dewey’s late work Experience and 
Education (1938/1998). Influenced initially by Hegel, but later and 
more deeply by James, Dewey developed a distinctively North 
American brand of radical empiricism that tied all knowledge to 
our lived encounters with reality. “Gone were the reliance on 
foundations, universal truths, and a quest for certainty. In its place 
was a deeply contextual, action- oriented epistemology that allowed 
for the contingencies of a changing world” (Roberts, 2008, p. 22). 
Fairfield (2009) summed up Dewey’s conception this way:
It is the nature of experience to be at once passive and active, nor 
merely to receive sensory input but actively to interpret, categorize, 
and transform it in the manner of an experiment directed toward a 
pragmatic end. . . . Experience in this sense is life itself, the growth or 
being- in- motion of a worldly subjectivity. It is an experience that is 
temporal and adaptive, that adjusts itself to objects in the world while 
simultaneously transforming them to suit its own purposes and that is 
continually growing and expanding. (pp. 65– 66)
Dewey’s thought is famously difficult to encapsulate in a 
paragraph or two. However, Fairfield was surely right to emphasize 
the purposefulness of experience in Dewey’s formulation. In 
Experience and Education, Dewey (1938/1998) observed:
All of us have desires, all at least who have not become so pathological 
that they are completely apathetic. These desires are the ultimate 
moving springs of action. . . . The intensity of the desire measures the 
strength of the efforts that will be put forth. But the wishes are empty 
castles in the air unless they are translated into the means by which 
they may be realized. The question of how soon or of means takes the 
place of a projected imaginative end, and, since means are objective, 
they have to be studied and understood if a genuine purpose is to be 
formed. . . . In an educational scheme, the occurrence of a desire and 
impulse is not the final end. It is an occasion and a demand for the 
formation of a plan and method of activity. (pp. 82– 84)
Here, then, we find a clue to Dewey’s conception of imagination’s 
role in directing experience. As for the Romantics, it draws its 
energy from our deepest emotions and desires, but Dewey conjoins 
this with conscious intention: The imagination engenders 
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meaningful experience by conjuring up a wished- for state of affairs 
that motivates subsequent action. Of course, for imagination to 
perform this role, it must also be intimately connected with our 
knowledge of reality, on which we must call to form and carry out a 
plan of activity. With this in mind, we can find fresh meaning in the 
following points from Dewey’s (1897) famous “Pedagogic Creed,” 
four decades distant from Experience and Education, but never 
disavowed:
I believe that the image is the great instrument of instruction. What a 
child gets out of any subject presented to him is simply the images 
which he himself forms with regard to it.
I believe that if nine- tenths of the energy at present directed towards 
making the child learn certain things, were spent in seeing to it that 
the child was forming proper images, the work of instruction would be 
indefinitely facilitated.
I believe that much of the time and attention now given to the 
preparation and presentation of lessons might be more wisely and 
profitably expended in training the child’s power of imagery and in 
seeing to it that he was continually forming definite, vivid, and 
growing images of the various subjects with which he comes in contact 
in his experience. (The Nature of Method section, para. 7)
If we understand “image” as referring to the active contents of 
the imagination, Dewey seems to be conceiving of education as a 
kind of imaginative stocking up of firsthand information (Reed, 
1996) or personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1974) that enables learners 
to discover more possibilities for purposeful action or, conversely, 
a process of purposeful action leading to imaginative growth. 
Dewey, it must be said, did not use the term imagination exten-
sively or consistently (Fairfield, 2009, p. 118). He did, however, in 
the period of his most mature thought, emphasize that it “animates 
and pervades all processes of making and observation. It is a way of 
seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole” 
(Dewey, 1934, p. 267). In this statement we see the two sides of 
experience, the active (making) and the passive (observation), 
brought together under the one quality of mind. “There is always 
some measure of adventure in the meeting of mind and universe,” 
Dewey added, “and this adventure is, in its measure, imagination” 
(Dewey, 1934, p. 267).
This, then, is a more directed and purposeful conception of 
imaginative experience than that of Emerson and Abram. The goal 
here is not imaginative participation but imaginative realization: 
the pursuit of consciously planned activities for preconceived ends. 
The educational adventure consists not in letting one’s awareness 
be taken up and shaped by the external world but in grappling with 
that world to bring something new into being (something material, 
perhaps, but also something intellectual, a new insight into how 
that world can manifest itself in our experience). As is well known, 
Dewey’s guiding model for the educational process was based on 
experimental inquiry, with its rationalist and systematic approach 
to discovering deeper patterns and meanings in experience. Art as 
Experience makes it clear, however, that he did not see this as 
opposed to an aesthetic mode of understanding. Rather, “intellec-
tual experience . . . must bear an esthetic stamp to be itself com-
plete” (1934, p. 38). For Dewey, the achievement of an end was 
integral and necessary to that completeness.
Perhaps curiously, there is nothing in Egan’s theory of 
imaginative development that corresponds to this productive and 
goal- oriented conception of imagination, even though it is clearly 
relevant to many kinds of educational activity. Yet if one thinks of it 
as the experiential side of an imaginative mode called Realization, 
its connections with Egan’s Romantic understanding become 
apparent. The world is seen by the Romantic imagination as a vast 
stage for the enactment of human hopes, fears, passions, strivings. 
Its concern is with the limits of possibility, with great deeds and 
heroic figures, with rebellion and idealism. It is an imaginative style 
passionately preoccupied with doing. According to Egan, it 
develops out of Mythic understanding in large part because of the 
way in which literacy reorganizes our thinking. But we might also 
see it as part of a new imaginative project of the self, one that seeks 
greater agency and autonomy in the world. As Egan (1997) 
observed:
When we are ten, we are very much at the mercy of the world around 
us. We are typically subject to endless rules and regulations— parental, 
societal, and, not least, natural. . . . The tension characteristic of 
romance comes from the desire to transcend a threatening reality 
while seeking to secure one’s identity within it.
A characteristic of Romantic understanding, then, is its ready 
association with transcendent human qualities, or human qualities 
exercised to a transcendent degree. This observation is important for 
the education of children from about eight to fifteen because almost 
any curriculum material can be made understandable if students can 
associate “romantically” with such qualities within it. This is, I might 
note in passing, not a matter of manipulating students to learn the 
knowledge we “privilege,” but rather a matter of having the courtesy to 
attend to how they can best make sense of any knowledge. (p. 90)
Under this this theme of “transcendence within reality,” 
Egan grouped such typical adolescent preoccupations as hobbies 
and collecting, extremes and limits (such as sporting statistics or 
the Guinness Book of World Records), pop culture heroes such as 
film or music stars, trivia contests and reality TV shows, and so 
on. It is evident that this phase of imaginative development tends 
to find its contents in popular culture rather than in the process 
of formal education. Similarly, the kind of experiential engage-
ment Dewey saw as most valuable (that is, goal- directed, socially 
mediated, imaginative activity motivated by genuine interest) 
tends to take place in informal educational settings: sports and 
physical recreation, art and craft classes, music, theater, and 
dance, and so on. This too grows in importance as children enter 
adolescence, becoming for some a vital and lasting source of 
meaning in their lives.
We can read Dewey and Egan, then, as urging that formal 
education make greater efforts to tap the upwelling of physical, 
emotional, and intellectual energy associated with the transition to 
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adulthood and the growing importance of agency in the process of 
self- development. Consistent with their differing philosophies and 
sources of inspiration, Egan has emphasized how this can be done 
through language, while Dewey placed the emphasis on experi-
ence. Writing in the postmodern era, Egan is more at ease with the 
notion of there being differences, tensions, and even ruptures in 
our ways of grasping the world; for him, Romantic understanding 
is just one facet of our intellectual development, to be appreciated 
and applied but not transformed into a single foundational idea. 
This was not Dewey’s project; he was after a unified system, a single 
epistemology, and this led him to place more faith in one particular 
conception of experience than it could reasonably bear (Jay, 2004). 
Yet at the center of his thought was a vision of imagination actively 
and creatively engaged with the world, and this helps us to see what 
is missing in Egan’s emphasis on language as the engine of imagina-
tive development. Taking our cue from the earlier pairing of 
Somatic and Mythic understanding, we might think of Romantic 
understanding as complemented by an experiential partner, a kind 
of understanding that develops when the imagination is involved in 
visualizing the consequences of purposeful action. I propose to call 
this Harmonic understanding.
This of course is not a concept intended to encompass all of 
Dewey’s own philosophy or educational vision. Rather, I seek to 
distill what he has to say about the relationship between imagina-
tion and experience that is educationally most insightful and 
useful, setting this within the context of a process of imaginative 
development characterized by losses and gains (Egan, 1997). 
Harmonic understanding does entail a greater sense of separation 
between self and world than Somatic understanding does, a tension 
that can be threatening, daunting, frustrating, but also intriguing, 
adventurous, exciting. Like Romantic understanding, Harmonic 
understanding encourages a focus on human agency, on the 
particularities of individuals and situations, on the limits of 
possibility and the quest for excellence, and on the shaping of 
islands of order and purpose in a world that resists human inten-
tions. Like Romantic understanding, it has the potential to drift 
toward the trivial, unless it is guided by real social interests, the 
accumulated wisdom of a tradition or discipline, and the consid-
ered judgment of teachers, mentors, or users (Dewey, 1938/1998). 
But if it is routinely neglected, as is common in formal schooling, 
any skilled task can descend into humdrum imitation or meaning-
less drudgery.
Referring back to Table 1 may help set these new ideas in the 
context of those we have already covered. It is now apparent that the 
left- hand column of the table represents a kind of hermeneutic 
developmental process: what I have elsewhere called “growing into 
the world” (Fettes, 2012). I am suggesting that Participation and 
Realization are two of the most fundamental modes we have of 
engaging with the world, that this engagement necessarily involves 
the imagination, and that it engenders kinds of understanding that 
are both tacit/embodied (Somatic and Harmonic) and explicit/
linguified (Mythic and Romantic). Egan has written of the tension 
between Mythic and Romantic understanding, as well as the 
tension between Mythic and Somatic, and this point can be made 
more generally: Every kind of understanding is somewhat at odds 
with all the others. So what we are after, educationally, is not a 
gradual ascent toward a single unified understanding of the world. 
We are trying, instead, for versatility.
If fully implemented, this would lead to a very different 
approach to teaching the later elementary and early high school 
grades. A focus on human agency would transform much of the 
curriculum into dramatic explorations and reenactments of 
invention, discovery, and development; concomitantly, significant 
resources would be invested in helping each student develop skills 
in one or more areas of handicrafts, physical labor, artistic creation, 
or athletic performance. Compared to the Somatic/Mythic curricu-
lum, these units of study would last longer and place a greater 
emphasis on meaningful improvement over time. The goal would 
be, by early adolescence, to endow each student with a broad 
understanding of human capacities and achievement in general, 
and personal confidence in his or her own abilities in one or more 
valued areas of endeavor.
Imagination and Experience as Praxis
Although Roberts (2008) portrayed “experience as praxis” (p. 21) as 
a third (if uncommon) variation within experiential education, his 
discussion was more concerned with “the ways in which experience 
can be employed for hegemonic purposes” (p. 27) than with the 
conception of experience central to the critical tradition. I shall 
argue, however, that this conception is indeed distinctive and 
educationally relevant in ways that go beyond critique. Of course, 
in a tradition as diverse as critical pedagogy (cf., Darder, Baltodano, 
& Torres, 2003), to use a metaphor that invokes a center is to invite 
immediate rebuttal, and I would not expect this formulation to 
please everyone. Nonetheless, if we take Paulo Freire’s ideas and 
writings as a basic source of inspiration for a variety of critical 
theorists, we can endeavor to trace in them his thinking on the 
respective roles of experience and imagination in “the educational 
practice of a progressive option” (Freire, 1994, p. 1).
A good starting point is the following key passage in Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed:
Since people do not exist apart from the world, apart from reality, the 
movement [i.e., the process of educational development] must begin 
with the human- world relationship. Accordingly, the point of 
departure must always be with men and women in the “here and now,” 
which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from 
which they emerge, and in which they intervene. Only by starting from 
this situation— which determines their perception of it— can they 
begin to move. To do this authentically they must perceive their state 
not as fated and unalterable, but merely as limiting— and therefore 
challenging. (Freire, 2000, p. 85)
Freire presented “the situation”— the normal state of affairs in 
which most people live— as something static, confining, working 
against the existential process of becoming that he equated with 
authentic education. It follows that for him, the normal range of 
experience that characterizes “the situation” is not truly educa-
tional; indeed, because people are “submerged” in it, it is in a sense 
antieducational because it normalizes oppression, whether one is 
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on the giving or the receiving side of it. The kind of experience that 
educators should be aiming for is one that “engages people as 
beings aware of their incompletion” and teaches them “to appre-
hend [their] situation as an historical reality susceptible of 
transformation” (Freire, 2003, pp. 84– 85).
This process, or movement, brings imagination and experi-
ence together in a characteristic way. We can’t begin to see reality 
clearly, in the Freirean account, until we have a sense of how it 
could be different. This awakening of the imagination, on the other 
hand, can’t take place at a remove from experience, for example, in 
abstract analysis or rhetoric; it has to be situated as clearly as 
possible in the material particulars of people’s lives. This means, in 
practice, that education involves dialogue, because ultimately no 
one can speak authoritatively on behalf of another’s experience: 
Each person must name the world for himself or herself but have 
the humility to listen to and learn from others’ acts of naming as 
well. And this naming is never just concerned with how things are, 
here and now; it reaches toward what utopian philosopher Bloch 
called the “not yet” (Giroux & McLaren, 1997, p. 146) and Freire 
(2000) called “untested feasibility” (p. 113).
Few have noted how central this imaginative movement is to 
Freirean pedagogy (McLaren & De Lissovoy, 2002):
The transformation of social conditions involves a rethinking of the 
world as a particular world, capable of being changed. But the 
reframing proposed here depends upon the power of the imagination 
to see outside, beyond, and against what is. More than a cognitive or 
emotional potential, the human imagination, in Freire’s view, is 
capable of a radical and productive envisioning that exceeds the limits 
of the given. It is in this capacity that everyone’s humanity consists, 
and for this reason it can never be the gift of the teacher to the student. 
Rather, educator- student and student- educator work together to 
mobilize the imagination in the service of creating a vision of a new 
society. (p. 902)
Yet it is equally important to visualize the Freirean imagina-
tion as embedded in experience, so that this utopian project is 
from the beginning an active and particular one, rooted in “a 
concrete engagement in mundane reality” (Giroux & McLaren, 
1997, p. 151). Going beyond Participation and Realization, the 
mode of understanding that Freire was striving for might be 
termed imaginative implication. It involves coming to under-
stand both how one’s own situation and customary actions are 
implicated in broader social relations (of oppression or libera-
tion) and what different futures may be implied by changing 
one’s actions in the present. The principal tools for bringing this 
about are one’s fellow human beings, who by bringing their 
different life experiences, perspectives, and specialized knowl-
edge to the dialogue help to create new understandings and 
possibilities for action.
Those familiar with Dewey will immediately recognize some 
familiar themes here, notably in the emphasis on dialogue as a 
cardinal principle of genuine education— dialogue that engages 
teachers as much as students (Fairfield, 2009, pp. 42– 43). Yet Freire 
was willing to go much further in asserting the transformative 
potential of education. Where Dewey thought in terms of a gradual 
adjustment of the students’ understanding, Freire was more 
interested in qualitative shifts, when reality is suddenly viewed 
through new eyes. For Dewey, our grasp on the world grows 
through the accumulation of many particular insights, solutions to 
concrete problems we are confronted with. For Freire (2000), the 
concrete problems are only instances of something much more 
profound, which he termed “revolutionary praxis” (p. 131) and 
which requires a deeper insight into the underlying structures of 
experience:
People will be truly critical if they live the plenitude of the praxis, that 
is, if their action encompasses a critical reflection which increasingly 
organizes their thinking and thus leads them to move from a purely 
naïve knowledge of reality to a higher level, one which enables them to 
perceive the causes of reality. (p. 131)
The movement that Freire described closely resembles the 
transition, in Egan’s scheme of imaginative development, from 
Romantic to Philosophic understanding. Noting Warnock’s (1976) 
remark that “imagination can stretch out towards what imagina-
tion cannot comprehend” (p. 58), Egan (1997) argued that the 
powerful urge to build causal models of reality “follows the stretch 
of the imagination and the subsequent construction of the 
linguistic and conceptual tools required to secure the mind’s hold 
on what the imagination grasped towards” (p. 123). Such a move, he 
suggested, is inherently reflexive:
The romantic perspective on history or on the social or natural worlds 
focused the younger student’s mind on the extremes, on the more 
fascinating facts, on vivid true stories, dramatic events, heroes, and so 
on. The Romantic student recognizes, of course, that all these bright 
bits and pieces are parts of the one real world, but the connections 
between them are not particularly interesting. The new theoretic 
language [of Philosophic understanding] helps to generate, or is a 
symptom of, a significantly different perspective in which the bright 
bits and pieces are seen increasingly as parts of general wholes, 
systems, and processes. History, for example, is no longer perceived 
primarily as a set of vivid events, styles of living, and heroic characters 
but rather as a single complex process, a continuum of styles, examples 
of the possible range of human behaviour and human nature. The 
connections among things come increasingly into prominence, and the 
Philosophic students’ connection with things comes increasingly from 
the realization that they themselves are parts of the complex processes 
and systems that make up the world. (pp. 120- 121)
The utopian urge in Freire’s conception of experience finds its 
equivalent, in the Philosophic imagination, in the quest for the 
perfect theory, the great explanatory principle: “Establishing the 
truth about history, society, and the cosmos is serious business. 
When Philosophic understanding dominates the mind, it can work 
with powerful intensity” (Egan, 1997, p. 125). An important 
dimension of educating for Implication, then, is to challenge the 
inevitable weaknesses and limitations in our understanding, giving 
rise to an endless process of imaginative growth in which no truth 
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is ever fixed or immutable, but overarching visions and theories of 
reality still play an essential role. Both Egan and Freire may be 
termed critical realists in this sense (see Morrow & Torres, 2002, on 
Freire), even though neither goes to great lengths to justify his 
epistemology or ontology.
Since critical realism is also a viable philosophy for the natural 
sciences (Bhaskar, 1997), it is perhaps not surprising that there are 
resonances between Freire’s conception of experience and that 
which holds for the wildlife biologist, the expert naturalist, the field 
geologist, and so on. For people immersed in the more- than- 
human world, each encounter with reality speaks of a web of 
connections that can only be grasped through extensive direct 
experience, in which intuition and imagination may be aided by all 
kinds of descriptive and theoretical tools. Developing such 
understanding is part and parcel of developing a kind of rootedness 
or at- homeness in the world, reflected in the way Freire emphasized 
people’s rootedness in their families, communities, and “situations.” 
Accordingly, I propose to call this kind of imaginative engagement 
with experience Endemic understanding. In its most common 
biological meaning, endemic refers to a species that is native to a 
particular area, with an etymology that goes back to Greek demos, 
“people (of a place).” But we might also read it as end- emic, that is, 
as a term describing the understanding that comes with such 
“insiderness” (endos). Endemic understanding, in this sense, 
develops through the effort of the imagination to grasp the deep 
structures underlying experience and how one is implicated in 
them— not just in Freirean pedagogy but in all forms of endeavor 
that entail a long- term experiential engagement with wholes, 
systems and processes. Fesmire’s (2010) conception of “ecological 
imagination” and Ingold’s (2000) discussion of the role of imagina-
tion in developing a “dwelling perspective” are examples of contem-
porary writers (a philosopher and an anthropologist, respectively) 
grappling with closely related ideas.
Both Freirean and Deweyan pedagogies have been sternly 
criticized for their supposed lack of appreciation for local identities 
and traditions, and hence antiecological bias (Bowers, 2006). The 
perspective developed here is more positive. In so far as those 
pedagogies contribute to the development of Harmonic and 
Endemic understanding, by insisting on the value of learners’ direct 
engagement with purposeful action and situated dwelling- in- the- 
world, they are compatible with the development of a deep ethical 
relationality with that world. But this is a more complex task than 
affirming people’s right to name the world for themselves or 
nurturing their involvement in collective action. It is necessary to 
strive to understand the Philosophic ideas and principles that 
underlie present social and economic realities, in order to develop 
ecologically informed alternatives that can compete for people’s 
hearts and minds. There is no getting around the importance of 
Philosophic understanding for grasping how the world might be 
different than it is. On the other hand, Philosophic understanding 
in and of itself can be deracinated and deracinating, and there is no 
substitute for a Freirean- situated existential praxis in bringing it 
down to earth. This is the function Egan attributed to Somatic 
understanding in The Educated Mind; the framework in Table 1 
implies a more robust set of educational strategies to accomplish 
the same end.
As in the case of Realization, the development of imaginative 
Implication requires significant changes to our educational 
institutions. For one thing, a different time scale is involved. Just 
as the development of Harmonic and Romantic understanding 
takes place over longer time periods than are needed for mean-
ingful Somatic or Mythic development, Endemic and Philosophic 
understanding need longer periods still, measured in years rather 
than months or weeks. Rather than carving up the high school 
curriculum into small chunks defined by their disciplinary 
content, it would make more sense to treat it as a voyage through 
intellectual history and at the same time an exploration of place, 
community, and identity— with the tension between the two 
made explicit and problematic, as a defining feature of democratic 
schooling in the 21st century. The framework also calls into 
question much of what currently passes for environmental 
education: Without a commitment to Freirean dialogue about 
daily lived experience, and ultimately to “the plenitude of the 
praxis” (Freire, 2003, p. 131), understanding of our ecological 
Implication remains fragmentary and shallow rather than 
Endemic— confirming rather than reforming our unsustainable 
and unreflective ways of living in the world.
An Integrative Framework
We know that ethnicity, class, gender, location, and other social 
factors have a major impact on educational outcomes in the formal 
school system. Experiential educators have long seen one of their 
roles as leveling the playing field— making meaningful educational 
opportunities available to marginalized learners. I want to suggest 
that they accomplish this, in part, by mediating the growth of 
imaginative understanding and that such growth is not restricted to 
outdoor and other nonformal educational settings. Within the 
broader framework outlined above, phenomenological, Deweyan, 
Freirean, and imaginative educators might find common cause 
with each other and with other traditions barely touched on here: 
ecological, indigenous, arts- based and spiritual, among others.
This kind of general integrative scheme should not be taken as 
a substitute for these individual traditions. There is a depth of 
understanding that comes with particularity, for instance in the 
Waldorf school tradition inaugurated by Rudolf Steiner, which 
ranges across all of the kinds of understanding described here and 
goes into areas that I have left unexplored. What I hope to do is 
create a more fertile ground for conversation, collaboration, and 
mutual enrichment among communities of scholarship and 
practice that often display little awareness of or interest in one 
another. Egan’s work, for instance, though recognized through vari-
ous scholarly and professional awards, is rarely seriously critiqued 
or engaged with in the context of other educational traditions. This 
is not a situation that helps us address the urgent need for new 
models of education and schooling in an unsustainable (and 
undemocratic) global civilization.
The framework I have proposed is a fiction, of course. 
Establishing these different categories of tacit and explicit 
understanding is a way of getting a handle on the “quasi- chaos” 
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(James, 1904, “Substitution,” para. 2) of human life, of thinking 
more systematically and strategically about what we are trying to 
achieve as educators and how we go about it. The way to approach 
such a scheme, in my view, is to see what kinds of questions and 
practice it provokes— that is, to put it to an experiential test. I 
have found Egan’s work very useful for teachers and schools, 
albeit with some modification and elaboration; I hope that this 
extension of his ideas proves generative for others. Underlying it 
is the same tragicomic sensibility that has always impressed me in 
Egan’s work. Rather than a triumphant journey up and up to 
some gleaming summit, education becomes a tale of gains and 
losses, struggles and imperfections, while holding out the 
possibility of a deeper and more joyful engagement with the 
world for any learner at any age. In the end, to my mind, that is 
what democratic education seeks to achieve.
References
Abram, D. (1997). The spell of the sensuous. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
Bhaskar, R. (1997). A realist theory of science (2nd ed). London, England: Verso.
Blenkinsop, S. (Ed.). (2009). The imagination in education: Extending the boundaries of 
theory and practice. Newcastle, England: Cambridge Scholars.
Bowers, C. A. (2006). Silences and double binds: Why the theories of John Dewey and 
Paulo Freire cannot contribute to revitalizing the commons. Capitalism, Nature, 
Socialism, 17(3), 71– 87.
Brann, E. (1993). The world of the imagination: Sum and substance. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield.
Chodakowski, A. (2009). Teaching made wonderful: Redesigning teacher education with 
imagination in mind (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Simon Fraser University, 
Burnaby, Canada.
Chodakowski, A., Egan, K., Judson, G. C., & Stewart, K. (2011). Some neglected 
components of teacher education programs. In C. J. Craig (Ed.), Cultivating 
curious and creative minds, pp. 5– 21. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Darder, A., Torres, R. D., & Baltodano, M. (Eds.). 2002. The critical pedagogy reader. New 
York, NY: RoutledgeFalmer.
Dewey, J. (1897). My pedagogic creed. Retrieved from http://dewey.pragmatism.org/
creed.htm
Dewey, J. (1934). Art as experience. New York: Minton, Balch & Co.
Dewey, J. (1998). Experience and education: The 60th anniversary edition. West Lafayette, 
IN: Kappa Delta Pi. (Original work published 1938)
Dewey, J. (2008). Democracy and education. In J. A. Boyston (Ed.), The middle works of 
John Dewey, 1899– 1924 (Vol. 9, pp. 1 – 370). Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press. (Original work published 1916)
Dickinson, M., & Goulet, C. (Eds.). (2010). Lyric ecology: An appreciation of the work of 
Jan Zwicky. Toronto, Canada: Cormorant Books.
Egan, K. (1979). Educational development. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Egan, K. (1986). Teaching as story telling. London, Canada: The Althouse Press.
Egan, K. (1988, Spring). Metaphors in collision: Objectives, assembly lines, and stories. 
Curriculum Inquiry, 18(1), 63– 86.
Egan, K. (1988). Primary understanding: Education in early childhood. New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Egan, K. (1990). Romantic understanding: The development of rationality and imagination, 
ages 8– 15. New York, NY: Routledge.
Egan, K. (1992). Imagination in teaching and learning in the middle school years. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Egan, K. (1997). The educated mind: How cognitive tools shape our understanding. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Egan, K. (2005). An imaginative approach to teaching. San Francisco, CA: Jossey- Bass.
Egan, K. (2006). Teaching literacy: Engaging the imagination of new readers and writers. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin.
Egan, K., & Madej, K. (Eds.). (2010). Engaging imaginations and developing creativity in 
education. Newcastle, England: Cambridge Scholars.
Egan, K, Stout, M., & Takaya, K. (Eds.). (2007). Teaching and learning outside the box: 
Inspiring imagination across the curriculum. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.
Emerson, R.W. (1906a). Experience. The Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Volume V. 
Essays, First and Second Series, pp. 292- 322. Philadephia: John D. Morris & Co. 
(Original essay published 1844)
Emerson, R. W. (1906b). Nature. The Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Volume III. Nature, 
Addresses and Lectures, pp. 5- 75. Philadephia: John D. Morris & Co. (Original essay 
published 1836)
Fairfield, P. (2009). Education After Dewey. New York: Continuum.
Fesmire, S. (2010, Summer). Ecological imagination. Environmental Ethics, 32, 183– 203.
Fettes, M. (1992). Language strategies for First Nation communities. Ottawa, Canada: 
Assembly of First Nations.
Fettes, M. (1997). Stabilizing what? An ecological approach to language renewal. In  
J. Reyhner (Ed.) Teaching indigenous languages (pp. 301– 318). Flagstaff, AZ: Center 
for Excellence in Education.
Fettes, M. (2003). Critical realism, ecological psychology, and imagined communities: 
Foundations for a naturalist theory of language acquisition. In J. van Dam & J. 
Leather (Eds.), The ecology of language acquisition (pp. 31– 47). Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
Fettes, M. (2005). Imaginative transformation in teacher education. Teaching Education, 
16(1) 3– 11.
Fettes, M. (2010). The TIEs that bind: How imagination grasps the world. In K. Egan &  
K. Madej (Eds.) Engaging imaginations and developing creativity in education,  
pp. 2- 16. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars.
Fettes, M. (2011). Senses and sensibilities: Educating the Somatic imagination. Journal of 
Curriculum Theorizing, 27(2) 114– 129.
Fettes, M. (2012, May 17– 19). Growing into language with hunters, singers, tricksters, and 
other imaginative guides. Paper presented at the 19th Stabilising Indigenous 
Languages Symposium, Kamloops, Canada.
Fettes, M., Nielsen, T. W., Haralambous, B., & Fitzgerald, R. (2010). Imagination and 
education: A many- sided vision. In T. W. Nielsen, , R. Fitzgerald, & M. Fettes 
(Eds.), Imagination in educational theory and practice: A many- sided vision  
(pp. 1– 20). Newcastle, England: Cambridge Scholars.
Fettes, M., & Norton, R. (2000). Voices of winter: Aboriginal languages and public policy 
in Canada. In M. Brant Castellano, L. Davis, & L. Lahache (Eds.), Aboriginal 
education: Fulfilling the promise, pp. 29– 54. Vancouver, Canada: University of 
British Columbia Press.
Fox, K. (2008). Rethinking experience: What do we mean by this word “experience”? 
Journal of Experiential Education, 31(1), 36– 54.
Freire, P. (1994). Pedagogy of hope: Reliving pedagogy of the oppressed. New York, NY: 
Continuum.
Freire, P. (2000). Pedagogy of the oppressed (30th anniversary ed.). New York, NY: 
Continuum.
Giroux, H., & McLaren P. (1997). Paulo Freire, postmodernism, and the utopian 
imagination: A Blochian reading. In J. O. Daniel & T. Moylan (Eds.), Not yet: 
Reconsidering Ernst Bloch (pp. 138– 162). New York, NY: Verso.
Greene, M. (1995). Releasing the imagination: Essays on education, the arts, and social 
change. San Francisco, CA: Jossey- Bass.
Ingold, T. (2000). Perceptions of the environment: Essays on livelihood, dwelling, and skill. 
New York, NY: Routledge.
democracy & education, vol 21, no- 1  feature article 11
James, W. (1904). A world of pure experience. Retrieved from http://psychclassics.yorku 
.ca/James/experience.htm
Jay, M. (2004). Songs of experience: Modern American and European variations on a 
universal theme. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Jones, R. A., Clarkson, A., Congram, S., & Stratton, N. (Eds.). (2008). Education and 
imagination: Post- Jungian perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge.
Judson, G. (Ed.). (2008). Teaching 360: Effective learning through the imagination. 
Rotterdam, Netherlands: Sense.
Korzybski, A. (1958). Science and sanity: An introduction to non- Aristotelian systems and 
general semantics (4th ed.). Lakeville, CT: International Non- Aristotelian Library 
Pub. Co., distributed by Institute of General Semantics.
Kozulin, A. (1998). Psychological tools: A sociocultural approach to education. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Leonard, T., & Willis, P. (Eds.). (2008). Pedagogies of the imagination: Mythopoetic 
curriculum in educational practice. New York, NY: Springer.
McLaren, P., & De Lissovoy, N. (2002). Paulo Freire. In Guthrie, J.W. (Ed.), Gale 
encyclopedia of education, Volume 3 (2nd ed., pp. 900−903). Woodbridge, CT: 
Macmillan Reference.
Morrow, R. A., & Torres, C. A. (2002). Reading Freire and Habermas: Critical pedagogy 
and transformative social change. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.
Nettle, D., & Romaine, S. (2000). Vanishing voices: The extinction of the world’s languages. 
Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Nielsen, T. W. (2004). Rudolf Steiner’s pedagogy of the imagination: A case study of holistic 
education. New York, NY: Peter Lang.
Nielsen, T. W., Fitzgerald, R., & Fettes, M. (Eds.). (2010). Imagination in educational theory 
and practice: A many- sided vision. Newcastle, England: Cambridge Scholars.
Pappas, G. F. (2008). John Dewey’s ethics: Democracy as experience. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
Polanyi, M. (1974). Personal knowledge: Towards a post- critical philosophy (corrected ed.). 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Rapport, D. J., & Maffi, L. (2011). Eco- cultural health, global health, and sustainability. 
Ecological Research, 26(6), 1039– 1049.
Reed, E. S. (1996). The necessity of experience. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Roberts, J. (2008). From experience to neo- experiential education: Variations on a theme. 
Journal of Experiential Education, 31(1), 19– 35.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language. A. Kozulin (Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky: Problems of general psychology. 
R. Rieber & A. Carton (Eds.). N. Minick (Trans.). New York, NY: Plenum Press. 
(Original work published 1934)
Warnock, M. (1976). Imagination. London: Faber.
Wordsworth, W. (1919). Ode: Intimations of immortality from recollections of early 
childhood. In A. Quiller- Couch (Ed.), The Oxford book of English verse 1250– 1900 
(no. 536). Retrieved from http://www.bartleby.com/101/536.html
